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1. Introduction
In this review article, we present an overview of clinical and
experimental approaches to the study of body representations
(also called body schema, corporeal awareness or bodily self),
providing insight into their neural and cognitive bases.
The ﬁrst section provides an overview of unilateral and non-
lateralized neurological disorders of the bodily self, often following
damage to the right cerebral hemisphere. Here, we address
hemiasomatognosia, feelings of disappearance and transformation
of body parts, supernumerary phantom limbs, somatoparaphrenia
and autoscopic phenomena involving the entire body. Disorders of
the bodily self have been difﬁcult to classify systematically, as
noted historically by pioneering researchers [1–5] and in more
recent works [6–8]. Indeed, the bodily self is in itself a conceptually
complex topic, because its experience is inherently multimodal,
subjective, and global. The bodily self arises from the dynamic
integration of bodily and environmental visual, tactile, proprio-
ceptive, vestibular, auditory, olfactory, visceral and motor infor-
mation [9]. Unlike other worldly objects, the body is the source of
its own perception, a subject and an object at the same time. The
human brain computes bodily information via different maps and
networks, notably areas of tactile, proprioceptive, vestibular and
interoceptive projection in the primary somatosensory, as well as
unimodal and heteromodal cortices, providing an uniﬁed and
global representation of the lived body, which allows for
experiencing it as a unique self and agent. To these sensory
components, recent research has added spatial and social factors
involved in self-other bodily interactions, and ego- and altercentric
perspectives on bodily and action perceptions [10,11].
Verbal and higher-level cognitive aspects of bodily knowledge
are sometimes subsumed under the concept of ‘‘body image,’’ said
to be a conscious and abstract representation of the body, involving
for instance the naming of body parts and general knowledge
about human bodies. This classical distinction with ‘‘body
schema,’’ which involves situated, directly experienced, uncon-
scious, and non-verbal aspects of the bodily self has been widely
discussed elsewhere (e.g., [12,13]), and we adopt the view here
that asomatognosia per se pertains to the body schema domain
[14,15]. As such, we think that disorders such as autotopoagnosia
(impaired naming and pointing of body parts on demand [16,17]),
Gerstmann’s syndrome (among other symptoms, impaired naming
and pointing of ﬁngers on demand [18,19]), or ideomotor apraxia
(impaired production of goal-directed gestures on demand [20]) –
all involving damage to the left parietal lobe – are clinically,
phenomenologically and conceptually different from disorders of
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This review article summarizes neuropsychological descriptions of abnormal body representations in
brain-damaged patients and recent neuroscientiﬁc investigations of their sensorimotor underpinnings in
healthy participants. The ﬁrst part of the article describes unilateral disorders of the bodily self, such as
asomatognosia, feelings of amputation, supernumerary phantom limbs and somatoparaphrenia, as well
as descriptions of non-lateralized disorders of the bodily self, including Alice in Wonderland syndrome
and autoscopic hallucinations. Because the sensorimotor mechanisms of these disorders are unclear, we
focus on clinical descriptions and insist on the importance of reporting clinical cases to better understand
the full range of bodily disorders encountered in neurological diseases. The second part of the article
presents the advantages of merging neuroscientiﬁc approaches of the bodily self with immersive virtual
reality, robotics and neuroprosthetics to foster the understanding of the multisensory, motor and neural
mechanisms of bodily representations.
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which should be cited to refer to this work.
the body schema and will not be addressed here. Thus, this review
focuses on disorders of the body schema, which are predominant
after right brain damage [21].
In the second section, we summarize current experimental
investigations in healthy subjects regarding the bodily self. We
focus on experimental paradigms that have created multisensory
conﬂicts (often involving visual and tactile signals) to modulate the
body schema (e.g., evoking a virtual Alice in Wonderland syndrome
[22] or the sense of having a child body [23]), the sense of owning
the body (e.g., evoking the rubber hand illusion [24]), and the sense
of embodied self-location (e.g., evoking an out-of-body–like
illusion [25]). These approaches have been found promising to
better understand the sensorimotor mechanisms that underlie a
large range of bodily disorders observed following brain damage or
during epileptic seizures or migraine episodes (Table 1).
Finally, we offer some concluding remarks highlighting the
importance of merging approaches from neuropsychology with
modern neuroimaging techniques and protocols from cognitive
neuroscience, immersive virtual reality, robotics and neuropros-
thetics for establishing a more comprehensive model of the human
bodily self and its disorders.
2. Disorders of the bodily self
2.1. Unilateral disorders of the bodily self
2.1.1. Hemiasomatognosia
The term ‘‘hemiasomatognosia’’ was coined by French neurol-
ogist Jean Lhermitte [3] to refer to a neglect, lack of interest, or
unawareness of one part or entire half of one’s body. Such patients
generally ignore their left arm and/or leg; they behave and speak as
if these did not exist. One of Zingerle’s [26] patients, with left
hemiplegia, did not pay the slightest attention to his left side, never
looked at it, never spoke about it. All orders to move were executed
on the right side, and, when confronted directly, the patient did not
see any absurdity in having only one body side. Zingerle and
Lhermitte saw in this profound unawareness for one body side the
source of other clinical phenomena such as anosognosia and
unilateral neglect. In the French clinical literature, notions such as
unawareness (me´connaissance) and lack of ownership (de´sappar-
tenance) were later often used to describe hemiasomatognosia’s
diverse manifestations. Frederiks [27] attempted to clarify the
issue by proposing a distinction between ‘‘conscious’’ and ‘‘non-
conscious’’ hemiasomatognosia. The former referred to patients
who perceived their body as incomplete or amputated, yet fully
realized the illusory nature of these feelings. The latter referred to
the subjective ‘‘disappearance’’ of one half of the body (most often
the left one), without the patient being able to notice this very
disappearance. Today, ‘‘non-conscious hemiasomatognosia’’ is
conceived of as personal neglect, motor neglect, or anosognosia
for hemiplegia. In each of these cases, there is some kind of
indifference for a body part. Personal neglect refers to the classical
picture of a patient who ‘‘forgets’’ to comb, shave or make up the
left side because of an attentional, perceptive or representational
disorder. Motor neglect refers to patients without objective motor
disorders who underutilize their left members [1,28]. These
patients behave as if they were hemiplegic although they are
not. Conversely, patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia behave
as if they are not paralysed: importantly, they not only deny that
they are paralysed, they also tend to ignore their left side in
general. Frederiks [27] summarized these symptoms as ‘‘atten-
tional disorders for the hemibody’’. Garc¸in et al. [29] wrote of a
particularly striking case: ‘‘The observer gets the feeling that the
subject behaves as if he underwent an amputation of the left side of
the body’’. The loss of lateralized body part representations can
occur at different levels of multisensory, sensorimotor or cognitive
integration. For instance, patients may recognize their own body
parts when presented visually but completely forget about them
when they are out of sight.
2.1.2. Feelings of amputation, hemi-depersonalization
Here we address disorders labelled ‘‘conscious hemiasomato-
gnosia’’ by Frederiks [27]. Such patients have vivid feelings that a
part of their body has disappeared or feel it strongly diminished or
blurred. Conceptually, these disorders seem to be the reverse of
phantom limbs after amputation (most amputees retain a
sensation of completeness despite having physically lost a body
part). In both cases, patients fully appreciate the illusory nature of
their sensations.
A related disorder is the feeling that a body part is no longer
attached to the rest of the body, as if it were ‘‘ﬂoating’’ at some
distance (sensation of disconnection or splitting). Symptoms of
absence or separation of body parts are usually of short duration
and appear mostly as part of seizures or migraine episodes
[2,4,27,30]. Other cases occur due to cortical or subcortical strokes
[31]. Direct electrical stimulation at the right temporo-parietal
junction can also induce this type of illusion in the visual modality
[32]. These symptoms are not necessarily accompanied by
hemiplegia, unilateral neglect or anosognosia. Sometimes, a
sensation of strangeness for an ‘‘absent’’ or ‘‘disconnected’’ body
part, then felt as ‘‘alien’’, ‘‘numb’’ or ‘‘empty’’, is reported: the term
hemi-depersonalization, or depersonalization for a body part, has
been suggested [1,3]. Patients with such symptoms often feel the
need to control these body parts by sight or touch, without such
strategies being always able to restore normal bodily feelings [1].
Other symptoms can involve distortions in the perceived size of
selected body parts or half of the body. These subjective alterations
of bodily size are vividly experienced but are usually recognized as
illusory. To refer to these symptoms, Frederiks [33] used the terms
microsomatognosia and macrosomatognosia. Both terms are
reminiscent of the concepts of hyposche´matie (i.e., a shrinking of
the body representation) and hypersche´matie (i.e., an enlargement
Table 1
Main models for neuropsychological, neuroscientiﬁc and neuroimaging investigations of the body schema/image and the sense of body ownership and self-location/
embodiment.
Bodily experience Clinical (neuropsychological) model Experimental (neuroscientiﬁc) model Functional neuroimaging model
Body schema/body image Macro/microsomatognosia [33]
Supernumerary phantoms [44]
Anorexia, bulimia nervosa
Body identity integrity disorder [108]
Rubber hand illusion [24]
Immersive virtual reality [22,23,104]
Shrinking illusion [109]
Body ownership Somatoparaphrenia [50]
Body identity integrity disorder [108]
Rubber hand illusion [24]
Virtual arm illusion [81]
Numbness illusion [84]
Rubber hand illusion [85,87]
Virtual arm illusion [110]
Self-location/embodiment Autoscopic hallucinations:
out-of-body experience [67]
Heautoscopy [74]
Full-body illusion [92]
Out-of-body illusion [25]
Body swap illusion [98]
Immersive virtual reality [103]
Full-body illusion [76]
Body swap illusion [86]
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of the body representation) originally coined by Bonnier [34] in
1905 to describe distortions of the body schema (asche´matie) in
patients with sensory and central disorders [35]. In neurology,
microsomatognosia (hyposche´matie) occurs when a body part is
experienced as smaller than usual (e.g., some hemiplegic patients
perceive their hand as a child’s hand). In macrosomatognosia
(hypersche´matie), a body part is perceived as larger than usual,
oftentimes much heavier too. The illusion can expand to such
degrees that the body part is felt as ﬁlling the room or hitting the
roof. These disorders occur most often during migraine [36] or
epileptic seizures [2] but also after brain damage leading to
sensory or motor impairment [33,37].
2.1.3. Supernumerary phantom limbs
‘‘Supernumerary phantom limbs’’ refer to the subjective
experience of having an additional body part, usually a limb, felt
as an entity sharing properties with a physical body counterpart
and occupying a different place in space. Some patients experience
the presence of a ‘‘third limb’’ and clearly identify this experience
as an illusion, whereas others report multiple arm or leg
reduplications as part of a delusion and seemingly believe in their
physical existence [38–40]. In the latter case, the term ‘‘delusional
reduplication of parts of the body’’ has been applied [39]. Super-
numerary phantom limbs have been scarcely reported in the
literature [40–42], yet they display striking diversity in their
manifestations. In most cases, the ‘‘additional limb’’ is a static
somesthetic percept located separately, but on the same side, of a
plegic limb. It is sometimes felt as smaller and in different, or even
awkward, positions, than the physical counterpart limb.
Movements of the supernumerary phantom are rather rare and
most often automatic or involuntary (see Fig. 1 and [42]). A woman
with right fronto-mesial damage involving the supplementary
motor area and the cingular gyrus and no hemiplegia or motor
disorders reported the following peculiarity: whenever she moved
her physical limb, a phantom seemed to occupy, after a few
seconds, the place left by the real limb [43]. Thus, the existence of
this supernumerary phantom speciﬁcally relied on movements of
the real counterpart limb. Still another patient reported not only
being able to ‘‘trigger’’ and move her supernumerary phantom
voluntarily but also claimed to see it (as somewhat whitish and
transparent) and sometimes even felt it touch her face. In addition,
this complex phantom, as reported by the patient, could not
coexist in the same place with other objects or body parts (in which
cases it ‘‘disappeared’’ instantly) [44]. Such a clinical presentation
is rare but neatly illustrates the diversity of supernumerary
phantom limbs in terms of the involved modalities, motor aspects
and sensitivity to feedback. This diversity is also reﬂected in the
involved brain areas: most often, the right hemisphere is
implicated, but the basal ganglia, parietal lobe, thalamus, medial
prefrontal cortex or supplementary motor area can also be
involved [15].
2.1.4. Somatoparaphrenia
Gerstmann [45] coined the term ‘‘somatoparaphrenia’’ to refer
to clearly delusional disorders of the bodily self. According to this
author, some related cases deserved to be distinguished according
to the mental frame of the patients. Most patients with
hemiasomatognosia and anosognosia for hemiplegia remain
indifferent or make rather limited claims regarding their
impairment, whereas others seem to ‘‘stand apart’’ by virtue of
their sheer bizarreness and exuberance. Here, is Gerstmann’s
original deﬁnition of somatopraphrenia: ‘‘[A] speciﬁc psychic
elaboration (marked by formation of illusions, confabulations and
delusions) with respect to the affected members or side of the
body, believed or experienced as absent’’ (p. 912). Somewhat
confusingly, the term ‘‘verbal asomatognosia’’ has also been used
to refer to cases in which patients misidentify their own left hand,
presented visually by the experimenter for someone else’s hand
[46]. Somatoparaphrenia is mostly used to refer to false beliefs
regarding one’s body part or half body, the most frequently
reported being the belief that they belong to someone else. To that
extent, current and classical deﬁnitions of delusional disorders
directly apply to somatoparaphrenia [47–49]. However, as with
supernumerary phantom limbs, the clinical presentation of
somatoparaphrenia differs considerably among patients, which
suggests different types of somatoparaphrenia.
The most common type of somatoparaphrenia is the misattri-
bution of one’s body part (usually the left hand, arm or leg) to the
doctor, a nurse, a neighbouring patient, or someone unspeciﬁed
[26,45,50]. Some patients also misattribute their paralysed limb to
someone absent or even long dead [51]. A sophisticated and
delusional account of the event can be provided, oftentimes with a
Fig. 1. Supernumerary phantoms. A 37-year-old woman reported the sensation of
having a third left arm and less frequently reported the sensation of having a third
left leg. The patient had no voluntary control of the phantom limb movement, but
the phantom followed the motion of the real left hand. The patient was fully aware
of the illusory nature of her experience, although the phantom limbs felt so vivid
that she had difﬁculties distinguishing them from the physical limbs. MRI revealed
an infarction of the right dorsomedial frontal lobe as well as prenatal lesion of the
corpus callosum. Note that the patient’s drawing is mirror-reversed so that she
represented her left body on the right side of the image.
Reproduced from Hari et al. [42] Three hands: fragmentation of human bodily
awareness. Neurosci Lett 1998;240(3):131–4, with permission from Elsevier.
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persecutory ﬂavour. For instance, a patient reported by He´caen
et al. [52], went to the length of complaining by letter to a nurse she
accused of having taken away her arm and threateningly asked her
to bring it back. The intensity of the delusion can vary: some
patients acknowledge that their claims are bizarre, and others
steadfastly hold onto their beliefs. By closely inspecting the arm
from the shoulder down, patients can come to realize that it
belongs to them, but not always [51]. One patient thus declared:
‘‘my eyes and my feelings don’t agree, and I must believe my
feelings. I know they look like mine [the affected limbs], but I can
feel they are not, and I can’t believe my eyes’’ [5].
One patient reported by He´caen and de Ajuriaguerra provides a
good illustration of how difﬁcult it is sometimes to categorize these
disorders [2]. This patient spontaneously denied that his left hand
belonged to him but did not attribute it to someone else (when
shown his hand, he simply said ‘‘it’s not mine’’). However, upon
seeing the doctor’s hand, he claimed he recognized his hand
(‘‘there is mine’’). The patient held to this idea even when the
doctor produced movements with his hand and took a few steps
back. He began to doubt his assertion only when the doctor was too
far away (‘‘I’m starting to believe that it is not mine’’). Thus, there
are 2 types of ownership misattribution in somatoparaphrenia:
some patients identify their limb as from another person (self-as-
other error), while others identify another person’s limb as their
own (other-as-self error, this type being much more rarely
reported).
Brain damage leading to somatoparaphrenia involves a wide
fronto-temporo-parietal network in the right hemisphere and
more speciﬁcally the insula, the prefrontal and orbitary cortex, the
underlying white matter and subcortical structures (thalamus,
basal ganglia and amygdala) [50,53–55] as well as the hippocam-
pus [15]. The implication of multisensory regions in the abnormal
sense of owning a body suggests that coherent multisensory
integration is required for elaborating bodily self-consciousness.
Somatoparaphrenia, like many other alterations of bodily self-
consciousness [9], may in part be related to misintegration of or
conﬂicts between proprioceptive, interoceptive and vestibular
signals about one’s body position and motion with visual signals
from the body. Interestingly, sensory signals modulation by caloric
vestibular stimulation [56–58] and visual inspection of the
disowned hand in a mirror [59] can signiﬁcantly decrease
somatoparaphrenic delusions. Therefore, body ownership is under
the control of peripheral sensory signals.
2.2. Non-lateralized and bilateral disorders of the bodily self
The previous section provided an overview of lateralized
(mostly on the left side) disorders of the bodily self. Here, we
brieﬂy address non-speciﬁcally lateralized disorders and disorders
extending to the entire body. For instance, macrosomatognosia can
sometimes involve the head or the entire body, inducing feelings of
enormity or of ‘‘ﬁlling the room’’. This kind of symptom occurs
mostly during migraine auras and are called Alice in Wonderland
syndrome [60]. Other patients can feel their entire body as absent
or unreal, typically during depersonalization [61] or, in more
extreme cases, describe their body as dead or non-existent, a
condition called Cotard syndrome (which Lhermitte termed ‘‘total
asomatognosia’’ [3]). More generally, such symptoms and those
that follow can be conceptualized as ‘‘complete’’ forms of the
unilateral disorders reviewed in the previous sections [62–64].
The most striking disorders involving the misrepresentation of
the entire body are those sometimes labelled ‘‘illusory doubles’’,
reminiscent of the ‘‘delusional reduplication of body parts’’
described above, and of the ‘‘double’’ and doppelga¨nger motives
in romantic and gothic literature [65]. Such striking alterations of
the global bodily self occur under varied circumstances, not
necessarily pathological, and are most often transitory. They are
currently described and studied under the term ‘‘autoscopic
phenomena’’ [66–68]. This area includes multimodal illusions
producing more or less complete doubles of the body. Subjects can
thus perceive a visual projection of their own body in front of them
(autoscopic hallucination), in which case the ‘‘double’’ appears as a
mirror reﬂection in external space, while the real self remains
ﬁrmly tight to its physical body and location. Therefore, autoscopy
as such is mainly a visual phenomenon, although it can sometimes
involve some motor resonance when the double moves according
to the subject’s own movements.
In other cases, the subject reports feeling the location of the
‘‘self’’ at the same time in the projected double and in the physical
body (heautoscopy) or alternating between them. The ‘‘double’’
can then acquire some limited sensorimotor and psychological
autonomy and is thus close to the literary doppelga¨nger described
by Hoffmann, Dostoyevsky, Poe and Hogg. Heautoscopy has a
visual component but also involves unstable vestibular and
sensorimotor aspects [67,69] and a strong emotional afﬁnity (or
repulsion) towards the ‘‘double’’. When the double is not actually
seen but rather felt in close spatial proximity, the condition is
called ‘‘feeling of a presence.’’ The subject has a more or less
ﬂeeting sensation of someone’s presence nearby, without being
able to clearly perceive or identify it but also without experiencing
it as a double of oneself [70].
When the perspective of the subject is entirely relocalized in the
projected double and thus the subject has the vivid sensation of
being ‘‘out-of-the-body’’ and can ‘‘see’’ the physical body from a
distant and elevated perspective, the condition is called ‘‘out-of-
body experience’’ [32,67,68]. During such episodes, widely
popularized by their inclusion in the hallucinatory phenomena
called ‘‘near-death experience’’ [71], there is a very strong
vestibular involvement (feelings of lightness and ﬂoating, reversal
of the visuo-spatial perspective), and the purely autoscopic
component (‘‘seeing oneself’’) can be less prominent or altogether
absent [69,72,73].
In neurological cases, autoscopic hallucination, being mostly
visual disturbances, involves damage to the occipital cortex, often
unilaterally [74]. Other disorders, being more complex, involve
varied disturbances of multimodal and vestibular integration,
notably at the left posterior insula regarding heautoscopy [74], the
insula and a fronto-temporo-parietal network for the feeling of a
presence [75], and the right temporo-parietal junction for out-of-
body experiences [76].
In the next section, we describe experimental procedures
developed to study mechanisms underlying the bodily self in
healthy subjects, to better understand the disorders we have
described.
3. Neuroscientiﬁc investigations in healthy participants
In this section, we summarize recent work from neuroscience
and experimental psychology that has endeavoured to investigate
how the brain represents some aspects of the body and the self. We
focus on research of healthy participants related to the sense of
owning the body (altered in somatoparaphrenic patients) and self-
location/embodiment (altered during out-of-body experiences)
(see Table 1), 2 experiences deemed crucial for establishing a
minimal sense of selfhood [77].
3.1. Investigating body part representations
Healthy participants research has extensively used the ‘‘rubber
hand illusion’’ (RHI) [24,78] to investigate the multisensory
foundations of body ownership as well as its neural underpinnings
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(Fig. 2A). The RHI is evoked when a rubber hand placed in the
participant’s ﬁeld of view is touched in synchrony with the
participant’s hand (hidden to the participant). After a minute of
synchronous stimulation of the fake and real hands, some
participants report that the rubber hand feels as if it were their
own hand. Subjective reports measured by questionnaires (i.e.,
visual analog scales) indicate that illusory ownership for the
rubber hand is signiﬁcantly larger for synchronous than asynchro-
nous visuo-tactile stroking. In addition, the RHI is characterized by
a mislocalization of the participant’s hand in space. When asked to
locate their hand in the horizontal plane (e.g., by pointing with
their right hand toward the tip of their left index ﬁnger),
participants tend to locate their hand closer to the rubber hand
than it actually is. This error in self-hand localization towards the
rubber hand has been termed ‘‘proprioceptive drift’’ and is
classically interpreted as a consequence of a ‘‘visual capture’’
[79,80].
Several variants of the RHI developed include presentation of a
virtual hand in immersive virtual environments (i.e., the ‘‘virtual
arm illusion’’ [81]; see Fig. 2B), or the presentation of multiple
hands [82]. Ehrsson et al. [83] developed a variant of the RHI during
which the experimenter uses the participant’s right index ﬁnger to
touch a left rubber hand while the experimenter touches the
participant’s left hand with the experimenter’s own ﬁnger (Fig. 2C).
This procedure creates the sensation that participants are touching
their own hand (instead of a rubber hand) with their right index
ﬁnger. Another paradigm, the ‘‘numbness illusion’’ [84], replaces
the rubber hand by a confederate’s hand. In this illusion, the
participant and the confederate have the palm of their hands
pressed against each other. Participants stroke their own left index
ﬁnger using their right thumb and at the same time stroke with
their right index ﬁnger the confederate’s index ﬁnger (Fig. 2D).
Participants may experience their left index as numb (hence the
term ‘‘numbness illusion’’) or bigger, as if it were encompassing the
confederate’s index ﬁnger. These sensations occur only when the
participant’s and confederate’s index ﬁngers are synchronously
stroked.
Several neuroimaging studies investigated the neural under-
pinnings of body part ownership by using the RHI. Brain areas
signiﬁcantly more activated during the RHI (i.e., during synchro-
nous visuo-tactile stimulation) were mostly located in the insula,
cingulate cortex, premotor cortex and extrastriate cortex (extras-
triate body area, EBA) [83,85,86]. Moreover, an increase in the
BOLD signal in the insula was positively correlated with the
magnitude of the proprioceptive drift [87]. Finally, one study [84]
recorded somatosensory evoked potentials during the numbness
illusion while participants received electrical stimulation of the
median nerve. The numbness illusion was associated with
increased amplitude of the N20 component of somatosensory
evoked potentials. This result suggests somatosensory enhance-
ment in the primary somatosensory cortex, in keeping with
increased evoked potentials over the somatosensory cortex
reported after real anaesthesia of the participant’s hand [88].
Fig. 2. Paradigms to investigate ownership for body parts. A. In the visual variant of
the ‘‘rubber hand illusion,’’ the experimenter uses 2 identical paintbrushes to
synchronously or asynchronously stroke the participant’s hand (not visible to the
participant) and a realistic rubber hand (visible to the participant). B. In the ‘‘virtual
arm illusion,’’ spatial and temporal synchrony is created between the touch applied
to the participant’s hand (top part of the ﬁgure) and the touch observed on the
virtual arm (bottom part of the ﬁgure: scene shown in the head-mounted display).
Reproduced from Evans and Blanke [110]. Shared electrophysiology mechanisms of
body ownership and motor imagery. Neuroimage 2013;64:216–28. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.09.027, with permission from Elsevier. C. In the
non-visual variant of the rubber hand illusion, spatial and temporal synchrony is
created between the touch applied to the rubber hand by the participant’s right
index ﬁnger (that is passively moved by the experimenter) and the touch applied by
the experimenter to the participant’s left hand. D. In the ‘‘numbness illusion,’’ the
participant (here on the left part of the picture) strokes with his right thumb the
dorsal part of his left index ﬁnger and at the same time strokes with his right index
ﬁnger the dorsal part of the confederate’s right index ﬁnger.
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We conclude this section by emphasizing recent ﬁndings
showing that illusory ownership over a fake hand changes several
aspects of the own body physiological states [89,90]. For example,
Moseley et al. [90] reported that illusory ownership of a right
rubber hand signiﬁcantly reduced the temperature recorded over
the participant’s right hand. This temperature reduction was not
found for the participant’s left hand and foot (not stimulated
during the experiment), so disrupting the sense of ownership for a
given body part modiﬁes temperature regulation at the level of this
same body part. Interestingly, body ownership abnormalities and
change in temperature regulation are associated in several clinical
conditions such as schizophrenia, neuropathic pain, anorexia and
bulimia nervosa [90]. Thus, the relation between body ownership/
disownership and homeostatic regulation may shed light on the
multisensory mechanisms of several conditions characterized by
abnormal body representations.
3.2. Investigating whole-body representations
Investigating the RHI and related illusions would not be enough
to understand the sensorimotor foundations of human bodily self-
consciousness because it addresses only body part representations.
Yet, in addition to representations of multiple body parts, and
perhaps more importantly, the bodily self, also entails global and
coherent whole-body representation [9,77]. Accordingly, recent
neuroscientiﬁc investigations into the bodily self have endeav-
oured to adapt the RHI to the entire body by using the same
principles, that is, visuo-tactile or visuo-motor synchrony between
the physical body and the seen (fake) body [91].
In the ‘‘full-body illusion’’ [92], participants wore a head-
mounted display through which real-time videos of their own
body can be seen from the back (the video recording system being
placed a couple of meters behind their own body), or videos of a
plastic mannequin or a virtual character [92–96]. Thus, partici-
pants standing upright observed their own body (or the
mannequin’s body) as if it was seen from an external, third-
person perspective (i.e., as if participants were located some
meters behind this body) (Fig. 3A). When a tactile stimulation was
applied on the participant’s back, in synchrony with touch applied
to the back of the body depicted through the head-mounted
display, participants self-identiﬁed with this body. Self-identiﬁca-
tion (measured by using questionnaires) was signiﬁcantly stronger
after synchronous than asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking. As for
the RHI, self-identiﬁcation with the avatar decreased skin
temperature at the level of the participant’s body [97] and reduced
the participant’s pain perception [95]. In addition, the full-body
illusion was characterized by errors in self-localization in space.
Fig. 4 illustrates the procedures for measuring a ‘‘whole-body’’
proprioceptive drift and shows that participants localized them-
selves closer to the observed body after they received synchronous
visuo-tactile stroking. Across several variants of the illusion, the
mean proprioceptive drift was 17  7 cm for visuo-tactile stroking
and 3  6 cm for asynchronous stroking, which differed signiﬁcantly
Fig. 3. Experimental paradigms to investigate whole-body ownership and self-
location. A. Paradigm used to evoke the ‘‘full-body illusion’’: identiﬁcation with the
body seen in the head-mounted display and apparent forward shift in self-location.
B. Paradigm used to evoke the ‘‘out-of-body illusion’’: identiﬁcation with the body
seen in the head-mounted display and apparent backward shift in self-location.
Reproduced from Ehrsson [25]. The experimental induction of out-of-body
experiences. Science 2007;317:1048, with permission from The American
Association for the Advancement of Science. C. Paradigm used to evoke self-
identiﬁcation with a plastic mannequin’s body without change in self-location.
Reproduced from Petkova and Ehrsson [98]. If I were you: perceptual illusion of
body swapping. PLoS One 2008;3:e3832. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.
0003832. D. Immersive virtual environment coupled with motion tracking systems
to induce self-identiﬁcation with a child avatar seen in a head-mounted display.
Reproduced from Banakou et al. [23] Illusory ownership of a virtual child body
causes overestimation of object sizes and implicit attitude changes. Proc Natl Acad
Sciences U S A 2013;110(31):12846–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.
1306779110.
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(P < 0.005) [11]. Because the magnitude of this drift is rather small, as
for the proprioceptive drift observed during the RHI, it can be seen as a
compromise between the physical self-location and a full-blown
disembodied self-location at the position of the avatar the
participants self-identiﬁed with.
A variant of the full-body illusion is referred to as the ‘‘out-of-
body illusion’’ [25] (Fig. 3B). In contrast with the full-body illusion,
participants were stroked on their chest while they observed in a
head-mounted display a real-time video of their own body seen
from the back. Self-reports included statements such as ‘‘Wow! I
felt as though I was outside my body and looking at myself from
the back’’ [25]. Self-identiﬁcation with the seen body was
measured by recording skin conductance responses while parti-
cipants observed a threat directed towards the seen body. The skin
conductance response was larger after synchronous than asyn-
chronous visuo-tactile stroking. In another variant of the illusion,
participants bent their head forward as if they were looking at their
own stomach and feet [86,98,99] (Fig. 3C). They wore a head-
mounted display in which videos of a plastic mannequin were
shown from an elevated viewpoint. In contrast with the full-body
illusion and the out-of-body illusion, the mannequin was seen
from a ﬁrst-person perspective (but seen from a disembodied,
third-person viewpoint in the former illusions) and with a
descending viewpoint. Participants and the mannequin received
either synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking, and the
degree of identiﬁcation with the mannequin was measured both
subjectively (questionnaires) and objectively (skin conductance
response). Synchronous visuo-tactile stroking evoked stronger
self-identiﬁcation with the mannequin and stronger emotional
responses when participants observed a threat directed towards
the mannequin’s stomach.
Only a few functional MRI studies have analysed brain activity
during the body illusions described above. The ‘‘full-body illusion’’
modulates the BOLD signal at the temporo-parietal junction, in
close vicinity of areas that are most frequently damaged in patients
reporting out-of-body experiences [76]. In contrast, observing
from a ﬁrst-person perspective a mannequin’s body being touched
in synchrony with one’s body activated mostly the premotor cortex
but not the temporo-parietal junction [100].
Finally, it is notable that immersive virtual environments and
motion capture technologies have fostered investigations of the
multisensory foundations of body representations because they
allow presenting realistic human avatars and manipulating their
shape, size, age and skin colour [22,101–104]. A general outcome of
these virtual reality studies was that spatio-temporal synchrony
between the participant’s motion and that of an avatar embedded
in a virtual environment led participants to strongly self-identify
with the avatar. Recent studies indicate that sensorimotor
synchrony between the physical and virtual body not only
modulates the participants’ own body representation but also
alters aspects of their affective and moral judgments. For example,
synchronous motion between the participant and an avatar
depicting a 4-year-old child modiﬁed the participant’s body
schema, as measured by their ability to manipulate virtual objects
[23] (Fig. 3D). In this study, participants overestimated the size of
objects after they identiﬁed with a 4-year-old child avatar. In the
same line of research, self-identiﬁcation with an overweight avatar
changed the perceived size of the participant’s body and their
potential actions in the environment [104]. Several therapeutic
interventions in neurology and psychiatry have recently been
derived from immersive virtual environments given the apparent
ease to induce self-identiﬁcation with avatars and to modulate
bodily, social and affective representations by using appropriate
technologies [101,105].
4. Conclusions and clinical outcomes
Clinical cases and recent neuroscientiﬁc studies summarized in
this review indicate that representations of the body and self are
varied, multimodal and plastic. Regarding clinical cases, one fact
must be highlighted: our current understanding of the bodily self
historically mostly depends on careful examination of a wide array
of clinical conditions. As a private and subjective experience, the
bodily self and its disturbances can only be approached through
systematic and empathic questioning of patients willing to share
Fig. 4. Illusory self-location evoked during the full-body illusion. After a period of
synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, participants were
displaced backwards and asked to walk back to where they thought they were
located during the experiment. The position where participants stopped was taken
as a measure of self-location in the horizontal space during the full-body illusion.
This procedure was conducted to measure a ‘‘whole-body’’ proprioceptive drift,
similar to that measured with the rubber hand illusion. A. Participants walked
signiﬁcantly further towards the seen avatar after synchronous visuo-tactile
stroking (blue symbols) than after asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking (red
symbols). The zero position indicates the location of the participant’s body
during the visuo-tactile stroking and positive and negative values indicate drifts of
self-location towards and away from the seen avatar, respectively. Data are plotted
according to ref. 1a and 1b [92], ref. 2 [94], ref. 3 [96], ref. 4 [95], ref. 5 [111], and ref.
6 [112]. Reproduced from Lopez et al. [11] In the presence of others: self-location,
balance control and vestibular processing. Neurophysiol Clin 2015;45(4–5):241–54.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neucli.2015.09.001. Copyright 2015 Elsevier Masson
SAS. All rights reserved. B. Data are mean  SD proprioceptive drift calculated across
several variants of the full-body illusion.
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their feelings and sensations. To further investigate this topic,
investigators and clinicians must know their semiology and pursue
this purely clinical endeavour. Even in this day and age of new
neuroimaging technologies, data analysis methods and virtual
reality settings, patients and their stories remain the most precious
avenue to discover more about our sense of bodily awareness and
ownership. When possible, the clinical exam should involve a full
neurological, neuropsychological, psychiatric and neuroimaging
investigation. The interview should let patients speak by
themselves, describe their bodily feelings in their own words,
and then focus on more detailed aspects, such as those described in
the section ‘‘Disorders of the bodily self’’ of this article [6]. Some
questionnaires and guidelines have been published [6,106,107]. It
is highly unlikely that all disorders of the bodily self have been
discovered, described and labelled: we thus insist that clinical
investigation, case reports and case series are still an absolutely
necessary approach for the study of the bodily self.
However, as we have seen, experimental research can exploit
multiple methods and paradigms to further investigate neural,
cognitive, affective, spatial and social correlates of bodily
awareness. Virtual reality, robotics, neuroprosthetics and increas-
ingly other methods will certainly help delineate the mechanisms
for multisensory and cerebral bodily representations. Such studies
have already revealed the highly plastic nature of the bodily self,
sensitive as it is to rather simple visuo-tactile and visuo-motor
conﬂicts. From these results, these experimental methods now
seem to be very promising non-invasive approaches toward
rehabilitation of patients with neurologic and psychiatric dis-
orders.
Disclosure of interest
The authors declare that they have no competing interest.
Acknowledgements
Some of the research leading to these results received funding
from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) (REA
grant No. 333607) (BODILYSELF, vestibular and multisensory
investigations of bodily self-consciousness). C. Lopez’s research is
also supported by a grant from the VolkswagenStiftung (grant No.
89434: Finding Perspective: Determining the embodiment of
perspectival experience).
References
[1] Critchley M. The parietal lobes. New York: Hafner Press; 1953.
[2] He´caen H, de Ajuriaguerra J. Me´connaissances et hallucinations corporelles.
Inte´gration et de´sinte´gration de la somatognosie. Paris: Masson; 1952.
[3] Lhermitte J. L’image de notre corps. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Critique; 1939.
[4] Menninger-Lerchenthal E. Das Truggebilde der eigenen Gestalt. Berlin: Kar-
ger; 1935.
[5] Schilder P. The image and appearance of the human body. New York:
International Universities Press; 1935.
[6] Dieguez S, Staub F, Bogousslavsky J. Asomatognosia. In: Bogousslavsky J,
Godefroy O, editors. The behavioral and cognitive neurology of stroke. New
York: Cambridge University Press; 2007. p. 215–53.
[7] Gallagher S. How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University
Press; 2005.
[8] Thibierge S. Pathologies de l’image du corps : e´tude des troubles de la
reconnaissance et de la nomination en psychopathologie. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France; 1999.
[9] Blanke O. Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nat
Rev Neurosci 2012;13:556–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn3292.
[10] Brugger P, Lenggenhager B. The bodily self and its disorders: neurological,
psychological and social aspects. Curr Opin Neurol 2014;27:644–52. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1097/WCO.0000000000000151.
[11] Lopez C, Falconer CJ, Deroualle D, Mast FW. In the presence of others: self-
location, balance control and vestibular processing. Neurophysiol Clin
2015;45:241–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neucli.2015.09.001.
[12] Gallagher S. Body image and body schema: a conceptual clariﬁcation. J Mind
Behav 1986;7:541–54.
[13] De Vignemont F. Body schema and body image – pros and cons. Neuropsy-
chologia 2010;48:669–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2009.09.022 [pii:S0028-3932(09)00378-9].
[14] Lopez C, Dieguez S. La repre´sentation du corps et ses troubles : approches de
la neuropsychologie et des neurosciences cognitives. In: Pe´rennou D, Rode G,
Azouvi P, Brun V, editors. La cognition spatiale. Montpellier: Sauramps
Me´dical; 2015. p. 63–88.
[15] Dieguez S, Annoni JM. Asomatognosia: disorders of the bodily self. In:
Godefroy O, editor. Vascular cognitive impairment and dementia: the be-
havioral and cognitive neurology of stroke. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2013. p. 170–92.
[16] Pick A. Sto¨rrung der Orientierung am eigenen Ko¨rper. Psychol Forsch
1922;1:303–18.
[17] Fe´lician O, Ceccaldi M, Didic M, Thinus-Blanc C, Poncet M. Pointing to body
parts: a double dissociation study. Neuropsychologia 2003;41:1307–16.
[18] Gerstmann J, Fingeragnosie. Eine umschriebene Sto¨rung der Orientierung am
eigenen Korper. Wien Klin Wschr 1924;37:1010–2.
[19] Mayer E, Martory MD, Pegna AJ, Landis T, Delavelle J, Annoni JM. A pure case
of Gerstmann syndrome with a subangular lesion. Brain 1999;122:1107–20.
[20] Petreska B, Adriani M, Blanke O, Billard AG. Apraxia: a review. Prog Brain Res
2007;164:61–83.
[21] Berlucchi G, Aglioti SM. The body in the brain revisited. Exp Brain Res
2010;200:25–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-1970-7.
[22] Linkenauger SA, Leyrer M, Bu¨lthoff HH, Mohler BJ. Welcome to wonderland:
the inﬂuence of the size and shape of a virtual hand on the perceived size and
shape of virtual objects. PloS One 2013;8:e68594. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0068594.
[23] Banakou D, Groten R, Slater M. Illusory ownership of a virtual child body
causes overestimation of object sizes and implicit attitude changes. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A 2013;110:12846–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1306779110.
[24] Botvinick M, Cohen J. Rubber hands ‘‘feel’’ touch that eyes see. Nature
1998;391:756.
[25] Ehrsson HH. The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science
2007;317:1048.
[26] Zingerle H. U¨ber Sto¨rungen des Wahrnehmung des eigenen Ko¨rpers bei
organischen Gehirnerkrankungen. Monatsschrift Psychiat Neurol
1913;34:13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000203132.
[27] Frederiks JAM. Anosognosie et he´miasomatognosie. Rev Neurol Paris
1963;109:585–97.
[28] Castaigne P, Laplane D, Degos JD. Trois cas de ne´gligence motrice par le´sion
re´tro-rolandique. Rev Neurol Paris 1970;122:234–42.
[29] Garc¸in R, Varay A, Dimo H. Document pour servir a` l’e´tude des troubles du
sche´ma corporel. Rev Neurol Paris 1938;69:498–510.
[30] Heydrich L, Dieguez S, Grunwald T, Seeck M, Blanke O. Illusory own body
perceptions: case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness. Con-
scious Cogn 2010;19:702–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.
04.010 [pii:S1053-8100(10)00130-3].
[31] Arzy S, Overney LS, Landis T, Blanke O. Neural mechanisms of embodiment:
asomatognosia due to premotor cortex damage. Arch Neurol 2006;63:1022–
5.
[32] Blanke O, Ortigue S, Landis T, Seeck M. Stimulating illusory own body
perceptions. Nature 2002;419:269–70.
[33] Frederiks JA. Macrosomatognosia and microsomatognosia. Psychiatr Neurol
Neurochir 1963;66:531–6.
[34] Bonnier P. L’asche´matie. Rev Neurol Paris 1905;12:605–9.
[35] Vallar G, Rode G. Commentary on Bonnier P. L’asche´matie. Rev Neurol (Paris)
1905;13:605–609. Epilepsy Behav 2009;16:397–400. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.yebeh.2009.09.001.
[36] Robinson D, Podoll K. Macrosomatognosia and microsomatognosia in mi-
graine art. Acta Neurol Scand 2000;101:413–6.
[37] Rode G, Vallar G, Revol P, Tilikete C, Jacquin-Courtois S, Rossetti Y, et al.
Facial macrosomatognosia and pain in a case of Wallenberg’s syndrome:
selective effects of vestibular and transcutaneous stimulations. Neuro-
psychologia 2012;50:245–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsycholo-
gia.2011.11.018.
[38] Ehrenwald H. Vera¨ndertes Erleben des Ko¨rperbildes mit konsekutiver Wah-
bildung bei linksseitiger Hemiplegie. Monatsschrift Psychiat Neurol
1930;75:89–97.
[39] Weinstein EA, Kahn RL, Malitz S, Rozanski J. Delusional reduplication of parts
of the body. Brain 1954;77:45–60.
[40] Brugger P. Supernumerary phantoms: a comment on Grossi et al.’s (2002)
spare thoughts on spare limbs. Percept Mot Skills 2003;97:3–10. http://
dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.2003.97.1.3.
[41] Miyazawa N, Hayashi M, Komiya K, Akiyama I. Supernumerary phantom limbs
associated with left hemispheric stroke: case report and review of the liter-
ature. Neurosurgery 2004;54:228–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1227/01.NEU.
0000097558.01639.F5.
[42] Hari R, Ha¨nninen R, Ma¨kinen T, Jousma¨ki V, Forss N, Seppa¨ M, et al. Three
hands: fragmentation of human bodily awareness. Neurosci Lett
1998;240:131–4.
[43] McGonigle DJ, Ha¨nninen R, Salenius S, Hari R, Frackowiak RSJ, Frith CD.
Whose arm is it anyway? An fMRI case study of supernumerary phantom
limb. Brain J Neurol 2002;125:1265–74.
8
htt
p:/
/do
c.r
ero
.ch
[44] Khateb A, Simon SR, Dieguez S, Lazeyras F, Momjian-Mayor I, Blanke O,
et al. Seeing the phantom: a functional magnetic resonance imaging
study of a supernumerary phantom limb. Ann Neurol 2009;65:698–
705.
[45] Gerstmann J. Problem of imperception of disease and of impaired body
territories with organic lesions: relation to body scheme and its disorders.
Arch Neurol Psychiatry 1942;48:890–913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/arch-
neurpsyc.1942.02290120042003.
[46] Feinberg TE, Haber LD, Leeds NE. Verbal asomatognosia. Neurology
1990;40:1391–4.
[47] Devinsky O. Right cerebral hemisphere dominance for a sense of corporeal
and emotional self. Epilepsy Behav 2000;1:60–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/
ebeh.2000.0025.
[48] Cummings JL. Neuropsychiatric manifestations of right hemisphere lesions.
Brain Lang 1997;57:22–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/brln.1997.1832.
[49] Davies M, Davies AA, Coltheart M. Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of
delusions. Mind Lang 2005;20:209–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-
1064.2005.00283.x.
[50] Vallar G, Ronchi R. Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the
neuropsychological literature. Exp Brain Res 2009;192:533–51.
[51] Assal G. Non, je ne suis pas paralyse´e, c’est la main de mon mari. [‘‘No, I am
not paralyzed; it is the hand of my husband.’’]. Schweiz Arch Fu¨r Neurol
Neurochir Psychiatr 1983;133:151–7.
[52] He´caen H, de Ajuriaguerra J, Le Guillant L, Angelergues R. De´lire centre´ sur un
membre fantoˆme chez une he´miple´gique gauche par le´sion vasculaire avec
anosognosie. Evol Psychiatry 1954;19:273–9.
[53] Feinberg TE, Venneri A, Simone AM, Fan Y, Northoff G. The neuroanatomy of
asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry
2010;81:276–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2009.188946.
[54] Gandola M, Invernizzi P, Sedda A, Ferre` ER, Sterzi R, Sberna M, et al. An
anatomical account of somatoparaphrenia. Cortex 2012;48:1165–78. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.012.
[55] Baier B, Karnath HO. Tight link between our sense of limb ownership and self-
awareness of actions. Stroke 2008;39:486–8.
[56] Bisiach E, Rusconi ML, Vallar G. Remission of somatoparaphrenic delusion
through vestibular stimulation. Neuropsychologia 1991;29:1029–31.
[57] Rode G, Charles N, Perenin MT, Vighetto A, Trillet M, Aimard G. Partial
remission of hemiplegia and somatoparaphrenia through vestibular stimu-
lation in a case of unilateral neglect. Cortex 1992;28:203–8.
[58] Salvato G, Gandola M, Veronelli L, Agostoni EC, Sberna M, Corbo M, et al. The
spatial side of somatoparaphrenia: a case study. Neurocase 2016;22(2):154–
60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13554794.2015.1077257.
[59] Fotopoulou A, Jenkinson PM, Tsakiris M, Haggard P, Rudd A, Kopelman MD.
Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: dissociation between ﬁrst- and
third-person perspectives on body ownership. Neuropsychologia
2011;49:3946–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.011.
[60] Todd J. The syndrome of Alice in Wonderland. Can Med Assoc J 1955;73:
701–4.
[61] Sierra M, Lopera F, Lambert MV, Phillips ML, David AS. Separating deperso-
nalisation and derealisation: the relevance of the ‘‘lesion method’’. J Neurol
Neurosurg Psychiatry 2002;72:530–2.
[62] Blanke O, Arzy S, Landis T. Chapter 22: illusory reduplications of the human
body and self. Handb Clin Neurol 2008;88:429–58.
[63] Brugger P. From phantom limb to phantom body: varieties of extracorporeal
awareness. In: Knoblich G, Thornton IM, Grosjean M, Shiffrar M, editors.
Human body perception from the inside out. Oxford/New York: OUP USA;
2006. p. 171–209.
[64] Menninger-Lerchenthal E. Der eigene Doppelga¨nger. Bern: Huber; 1946.
[65] Dieguez S. Doubles everywhere: literary contributions to the study of the
bodily self. Front Neurol Neurosci 2013;31:77–115. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1159/000345912.
[66] Brugger P. Reﬂective mirrors: perspective-taking in autoscopic phenomena.
Cogn Neuropsychiatry 2002;7:179–94.
[67] Blanke O, Landis T, Spinelli L, Seeck M. Out-of-body experience and autoscopy
of neurological origin. Brain 2004;127:243–58.
[68] Blanke O, Mohr C. Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic
hallucination of neurological origin. Implications for neurocognitive mecha-
nisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness. Brain Res Brain Res Rev
2005;50:184–99.
[69] Lopez C, Halje P, Blanke O. Body ownership and embodiment: vestibular and
multisensory mechanisms. Neurophysiol Clin 2008;38:149–61.
[70] Brugger P, Regard M, Landis T. Unilaterally felt ‘‘presences’’: the neuropsy-
chiatry of one’s invisible Doppelga¨nger. Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychol
Behav Neurol 1996;9:114–22.
[71] Blanke O, Dieguez S. Leaving body and life behind: out-of-body and near-
death experience. In: Laureys S, Tononi G, editors. The neurology of con-
sciousness: cognitive neuroscience and neuropathology. Amsterdam: Else-
vier; 2009. p. 303–25.
[72] Lopez C, Heydrich L, Seeck M, Blanke O. Abnormal self-location and
vestibular vertigo in a patient with right frontal lobe epilepsy. Epilepsy
Behav 2010;17:289–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2009.12.016
[pii:S1525-5050(09)00694-5].
[73] Heydrich L, Lopez C, Seeck M, Blanke O. Partial and full own body illusions
of epileptic origin in a child with right temporo-parietal epilepsy. Epilepsy
Behav 2011;20:583–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2011.01.008
[pii:S1525-5050(11)00011-4].
[74] Heydrich L, Blanke O. Distinct illusory own body perceptions caused by
damage to posterior insula and extrastriate cortex. Brain 2013;136:790–
803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/aws364.
[75] Blanke O, Pozeg P, Hara M, Heydrich L, Serino A, Yamamoto A, et al. Neuro-
logical and robot-controlled induction of an apparition. Curr Biol
2014;24(22):2681–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.049.
[76] Ionta S, Heydrich L, Lenggenhager B, Mouthon M, Fornari E, Chapuis D, et al.
Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-parietal cortex support self-location
and ﬁrst-person perspective. Neuron 2011;70:363–74. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.009 [pii:S0896-6273(11)00200-5].
[77] Blanke O, Metzinger T. Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal self-
hood. Trends Cogn Sci 2009;13:7–13.
[78] Botvinick M, Neuroscience. Probing the neural basis of body ownership.
Science 2004;305:782–3.
[79] Pavani F, Spence C, Driver J. Visual capture of touch: out-of-the-body expe-
riences with rubber gloves. Psychol Sci 2000;11:353–9.
[80] Tsakiris M, Haggard P. The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuo-tactile
integration and self-attribution. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform
2005;31:80–91.
[81] Slater M, Perez-Marcos D, Ehrsson HH, Sanchez-Vives MV. Towards a digital
body: the virtual arm illusion. Front Hum Neurosci 2008;2:6.
[82] Folegatti A, Farne` A, Salemme R, de Vignemont F. The Rubber Hand Illusion:
two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Conscious Cogn 2012;21:799–812.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.02.008.
[83] Ehrsson HH, Holmes NP, Passingham RE. Touching a rubber hand: feeling of
body ownership is associated with activity in multisensory brain areas. J
Neurosci 2005;25:10564–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0800-
05.2005.
[84] Dieguez S, Mercier MR, Newby N, Blanke O. Feeling numbness for someone
else’s ﬁnger. Curr Biol 2009;19:R1108–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.cub.2009.10.055 [pii:S0960-9822(09)01917-4].
[85] Ehrsson HH, Spence C, Passingham RE. That’s my hand! Activity in premotor
cortex reﬂects feeling of ownership of a limb. Science 2004;305:875–7.
[86] Petkova VI, Bjo¨rnsdotter M, Gentile G, Jonsson T, Li T-Q, Ehrsson HH. From
part- to whole-body ownership in the multisensory brain. Curr Biol
2011;21:1118–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.05.022.
[87] Tsakiris M, Hesse MD, Boy C, Haggard P, Fink GR. Neural signatures of body
ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness. Cereb Cortex
2007;17:2235–44.
[88] Werhahn KJ, Mortensen J, Van Boven RW, Zeuner KE, Cohen LG. Enhanced
tactile spatial acuity and cortical processing during acute hand deafferenta-
tion. Nat Neurosci 2002;5:936–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn917.
[89] Barnsley N, McAuley JH, Mohan R, Dey A, Thomas P, Moseley GL. The rubber
hand illusion increases histamine reactivity in the real arm. Curr Biol
2011;21:R945–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.10.039.
[90] Moseley GL, Olthof N, Venema A, Don S, Wijers M, Gallace A, et al. Psychologi-
cally induced cooling of a speciﬁc body part caused by the illusory ownership
of an artiﬁcial counterpart. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2008;105:13169–73.
[91] Serino A, Alsmith A, Costantini M, Mandrigin A, Tajadura-Jimenez A, Lopez C.
Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-conscious-
ness. Conscious Cogn 2013;22:1239–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.concog.2013.08.013.
[92] Lenggenhager B, Tadi T, Metzinger T, Blanke O. Video ergo sum: manipulating
bodily self-consciousness. Science 2007;317:1096–9.
[93] Aspell JE, Lavanchy T, Lenggenhager B, Blanke O. Seeing the body modulates
audiotactile integration. Eur J Neurosci 2010;31:1868–73. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1460-9568.2010.07210.x [pii:EJN7210].
[94] Aspell JE, Lenggenhager B, Blanke O. Keeping in touch with one’s self:
multisensory mechanisms of self-consciousness. PLoS One 2009;4:e6488.
[95] Ha¨nsel A, Lenggenhager B, von Kanel R, Curatolo M, Blanke O. Seeing and
identifying with a virtual body decreases pain perception. Eur J Pain
2011;15:874–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpain.2011.03.013 [pii:S1090-
3801(11)00088-7].
[96] Lenggenhager B, Halje P, Blanke O. Alpha band oscillations correlate with
illusory self-location induced by virtual reality. Eur J Neurosci
2011;33:1935–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.07647.x.
[97] Salomon R, Lim M, Pfeiffer C, Gassert R, Blanke O. Full-body illusion is
associated with widespread skin temperature reduction. Front Behav Neu-
rosci 2013;7:65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00065.
[98] Petkova VI, Ehrsson HH. If I were you: perceptual illusion of body swapping.
PLoS One 2008;3:e3832. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.
[99] Petkova VI, Khoshnevis M, Ehrsson HH. The perspective matters! Multisen-
sory integration in egocentric reference frames determines full-body owner-
ship. Front Psychol 2011;2:35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00035.
[100] Petkova VI, Bjornsdotter M, Gentile G, Jonsson T, Li TQ, Ehrsson HH. From
part- to whole-body ownership in the multisensory brain. Curr Biol
2011;21:1118–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.05.022 [pii:S0960-
9822(11)00549-5].
[101] Sanchez-Vives MV, Slater M. From presence to consciousness through virtual
reality. Nat Rev Neurosci 2005;6:332–9.
[102] Slater M, Perez-Marcos D, Ehrsson HH, Sanchez-Vives MV. Inducing illusory
ownership of a virtual body. Front Neurosci 2009;3:214–20. http://
dx.doi.org/10.3389/neuro.01.029.2009.
[103] Slater M, Spanlang B, Sanchez-Vives MV, Blanke O. First-person experience of
body transfer in virtual reality. PloS One 2010;5:e10564. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pone.0010564.
9
htt
p:/
/do
c.r
ero
.ch
[104] Piryankova IV, Wong HY, Linkenauger SA, Stinson C, Longo MR, Bu¨lthoff HH,
et al. Owning an overweight or underweight body: distinguishing the physi-
cal, experienced and virtual body. PloS One 2014;9:e103428. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0103428.
[105] Falconer CJ, Slater M, Rovira A, King JA, Gilbert P, Antley A, et al. Embodying
compassion: a virtual reality paradigm for overcoming excessive self-criticism.
PLoS One 2014;9:e111933. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0111933.
[106] Marcel AJ, Tegne´r R, Nimmo-Smith I. Anosognosia for plegia: speciﬁcity, exten-
sion, partiality and disunity of bodily unawareness. Cortex 2004;40:19–40.
[107] Cutting J. Study of anosognosia. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1978;41:548–
55.
[108] Hilti LM, Brugger P. Incarnation and animation: physical versus representa-
tional deﬁcits of body integrity. Exp Brain Res 2010;204:315–26. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-2043-7.
[109] Ehrsson HH, Kito T, Sadato N, Passingham RE, Naito E. Neural substrate of
body size: illusory feeling of shrinking of the waist. PLoS Biol 2005;3:e412.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0030412 [pii:05-PLBI-RA-0203R3].
[110] Evans N, Blanke O. Shared electrophysiology mechanisms of body ownership
and motor imagery. Neuroimage 2013;64:216–28. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.09.027.
[111] Aspell JE, Heydrich L, Marillier G, Lavanchy T, Herbelin B, Blanke O. Turning
body and self inside out: visualized heartbeats alter bodily self-conscious-
ness and tactile perception. Psychol Sci 2013;24:2445–53. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0956797613498395.
[112] Heydrich L, Dodds TJ, Aspell JE, Herbelin B, Bu¨lthoff HH, Mohler BJ, et al.
Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies – evidence from two
different virtual reality techniques. Front Psychol 2013;4. http://dx.doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00946.
10
htt
p:/
/do
c.r
ero
.ch
